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Controlling Systemic Risk
through Corporate Governance
Steven L. Schwarcz1
Key Points
→→ Most of the regulatory measures to control
excessive risk taking by systemically important
firms are designed to reduce moral hazard and
to align the interests of managers and investors.
These measures may be flawed because they
are based on questionable assumptions.
→→ Excessive corporate risk taking is, at its core,
a corporate governance problem. Shareholder
primacy requires managers to view the
consequences of their firm’s risk taking
only from the standpoint of the firm and its
shareholders, ignoring harm to the public. In
governing, managers of systemically important
firms should also consider public harm.
→→ This proposal engages the long-standing
debate whether corporate governance law
should require some duty to the public. The
accepted wisdom is that corporate profit
maximization provides jobs and other benefits
that exceed public harm. The debate requires
rethinking for systemic economic harm.
→→ This policy brief rethinks that debate,
demonstrating that a corporate governance
duty can be designed to control systemic risk
without unduly weakening wealth production.

Excessive1 corporate risk taking by systemically
important financial firms is widely seen as one
of the primary causes of the 2007-2008 global
financial crisis. In response, governments have
issued or are considering an array of regulatory
measures to attempt to curb that risk taking
and prevent another crisis. This policy brief
argues that these measures are inadequate,
and that controlling excessive risk taking also
requires regulation of corporate governance.

Excessive Risk Taking
and Systemic Harm
Existing Regulatory Measures
to Control Excessive Risk
Taking Are Flawed
The regulatory measures to control excessive risk
taking by systemically important firms tend to
fall into two broad categories. Some are designed
to end the problem of “too big to fail,” assuming
that firms engage in excessive risk taking
because they would profit by a success and be

1

This policy brief is based in part on the author’s article: “Misalignment:
Corporate Risk-Taking and Public Duty” (2016) 92:1 Notre Dame
L Rev 1 [Schwarcz, “Misalignment”], online: <http://ssrn.com/
abstract=2644375>.

About the Author
Steven L. Schwarcz is a CIGI senior fellow
with the International Law Research
Program, and the Stanley A. Star Professor
of Law and Business at Duke University
School of Law, where he is the founding
director of the interdisciplinary Global
Financial Markets Center. His areas of
research and scholarship include insolvency
and bankruptcy law; international finance,
capital markets and systemic risk; and
commercial law. He is a fellow of the
American College of Bankruptcy, a founding
member of the International Insolvency
Institute, a fellow of the American College
of Commercial Finance Lawyers and
business law adviser to the American Bar
Association Section on Business Law.

bailed out by the government in case of a failure.2
Other measures are designed to control excessive
risk taking by aligning managerial and investor
interests, assuming that the investors themselves
would oppose excessively risky business ventures.3
These measures may be flawed, however, because
they are based on questionable assumptions. The
assumption that systemically important firms
engage in morally hazardous risk taking because
they expect a bailout has no real empirical support.
Some empirical studies conflate correlation and
causation, assuming that if many systemically
important firms engage in risky behaviour, that
behaviour was predicated on bailout expectations.4
Other empirical studies merely show that
systemically important firms can borrow at lower
cost, which does not say anything about whether
those firms in fact engage in morally hazardous risk
taking because there are many other reasons why
systemically important firms, which generally are
large, can borrow at lower cost than smaller firms.5
That assumption may also be contrary to
management incentives. Managers who cause
their firms to engage in excessive risk taking
in the expectation of a government bailout are
taking serious personal risks. If, as in the case of
Lehman Brothers, the government fails to bail
out the firm, those managers are almost certain
to lose their jobs. Even if a bailout occurs, it
may well be conditioned on those managers
resigning or otherwise giving recompense.6 In
either case, the ensuing reputational damage may
permanently end a manager’s financial career.7
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This is primarily a problem of moral hazard, that persons protected from
the negative consequences of their risky actions will be tempted to take
more risks.
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These include, for example, requiring a systemically important firm to
tie management compensation to the firm’s long-term performance, or
requiring a systemically important firm to maintain so-called contingent
capital, in which debt securities convert into equity upon specified
conditions.
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2344.

5

See e.g. Steven L Schwarcz, “Too Big to Fool: Moral Hazard, Bailouts,
and Corporate Responsibility”, 102 Minn L Rev [forthcoming in 20172018], online: <http://ssrn.com/abstract=2847026>.

6

See e.g. Jeffrey Friedman & Wladimir Kraus, Engineering the Financial
Crisis: Systemic Risk and the Failure of Regulation (Philadelphia, PA:
University of Pennsylvania Press, 2011) at 43.

7

Ibid.  

The assumption that a systemically important
firm’s investors would oppose excessively risky
business ventures is also questionable. What
constitutes “excessive” risk taking depends on
the observer: risk taking is excessive from a given
observer’s standpoint if it has a negative expected
value to that observer — i.e., the expected costs
to that observer exceed the expected benefits. It is
reasonable to assume that investors would oppose
risky business ventures with a negative expected
value to them. But because much of the systemic
harm from their failure would be externalized onto
the public (including ordinary citizens impacted
by an economic collapse), systemically important
firms can engage in risk-taking ventures that
have a positive expected value to their investors
but a negative expected value to the public.8
Regulators and policy makers are beginning to
recognize that the existing regulatory measures
are inadequate. Reporting on a widely attended
meeting at the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston
late last year, The New York Times observed that
“policy makers have made little progress in
figuring out how they might actually” prevent
another financial crisis.9 Donald Kohn, former
vice chair of the Federal Reserve Board, said
that the Fed “doesn’t really have the tools” to
prevent another crisis. Luc Laeven, the European
Central Bank’s director general for research,
summarized the consensus of the conference:
“Both monetary policy and macroprudential
[regulatory] policy are not really very effective.”
He then asked, “Do we have other policies?”10

Excessive Risk Taking is a
Corporate Governance Problem
We may well have other policies. Excessive
corporate risk taking results from managerial
decisions. At its core, therefore, it is a corporate
governance problem. The shareholder-primacy
framework for governance, followed throughout
the world, requires corporate managers to view
the consequences of their firm’s actions only from
the standpoint of the firm and its shareholders.
That perspective ignores externalities, including
harm to the public caused by the firm’s risk
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taking.11 The most direct way of controlling
that risk taking would be to regulate corporate
governance, to require managers to also consider
the public consequences of their firm’s actions.
Proposing such a requirement engages the
longstanding debate whether corporate governance
law should require some duty to the public. The
accepted wisdom is not to require such a duty —
that corporate profit maximization provides jobs
and other public benefits that exceed any harm.
This is especially true, the argument goes, because
imposing specific regulatory requirements and
making certain actions illegal or tortious — what
this policy brief will call “regulating substance,” in
contrast to “regulating governance” — can mitigate
the harm without unduly impairing corporate
wealth production. Opponents of a public duty
also argue that managers could not feasibly govern
if they had to take into account the myriad small
externalities that result from corporate risk taking.
Whether or not these arguments are sensible in
the traditional corporate context, they lose their
force in the face of systemic economic harm.
Systemic externalities are significant, including
the devastating harm caused by an economic
collapse. Regulating substance has so far proved
inadequate to control those externalities.
Regulating governance also has an intrinsic
advantage over regulating substance in controlling
systemic externalities. Regulating substance often
depends on regulators precisely understanding
the financial “architecture” — the particular
design and structure of financial firms, markets
and other related institutions — at the time the
regulation is promulgated.12 Because the financial
architecture is constantly changing, that type
of grounded regulation has value as long as it is
updated as needed to adapt to those changes.
But ongoing financial monitoring and regulatory
updating can be costly and is subject to political
interference at each updating stage. As a result,
financial regulation of substance usually lags
behind financial innovation, causing unanticipated
consequences and allowing innovations to escape

11 Schwarcz, “Misalignment”, supra note 1.
12 See Steven L Schwarcz, “Regulating Financial Change: A Functional
Approach” (2016) 100 Minn L Rev 1441.
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regulatory scrutiny.13 Regulating governance,
in contrast, can overcome that regulatory
time lag. To fulfill their governance duties, the
managers of a firm that is proposing to engage
in a financially innovative but risky project
must try to obtain the most current information
about the innovation and its consequences.
Regulating governance therefore could add
value to regulating substance in controlling
systemic externalities. Next, this policy
brief considers how corporate governance
regulation could be redesigned to accomplish
that without impairing profit maximization.

Stakeholder Model
A public governance duty would most clearly
be consistent with the stakeholder model of
governance, which considers the interests of
everyone affected by a firm’s actions to avoid
anyone being unfairly exploited. The public, of
course, is affected by a firm’s risk taking. This
model, however, adds little explanatory value
because there is fundamental disagreement on
the extent to which non-investor stakeholder
interests should be taken into account, valued
and balanced with shareholder interests.

Contractarian Model

Redesigning Corporate
Governance Regulation
In making corporate risk-taking decisions, the
duty that managers currently have toward
systemically important firms and their investors
should be expanded to the public, to reduce
systemic externalities. So long as it does not
unduly weaken wealth-producing capacity
(corporate wealth production being in the public
interest), such a public governance duty would
help to align private and public interests.
The analysis next considers first the
theory, and then the practicality, of
implementing a public governance duty.

Reconciling a Public Governance Duty
with Corporate Governance Theory
There are three theoretical models of corporate
governance: a stakeholder model, a contractarian
model and a shareholder-primacy model. As
explained below, a public governance duty would
not be inconsistent with these models except to the
extent it intentionally limits shareholder primacy.

13 See ibid (observing that this occurred in 2008, for example, when the
pre-crisis financial regulatory framework, which assumed the dominance
of bank-intermediated funding, failed to adequately address a collapsing
financial system in which the majority of funding had become non-bank
intermediated).
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A public governance duty would, at first glance,
appear to be inconsistent with the contractarian
model of governance — that a firm is a “nexus
of contracts” among private parties. After all,
members of the public are not contracting
parties. Contract law, however, does not limit its
application to contracting parties. Government
should be able to limit freedom of contracting
when the contracting causes externalities.
The critical question is which externalities
should count in limiting that freedom.
Even under contract law, there is no absolute
answer to that question. But we need to answer
only a much more limited question: Should
systemic externalities count in limiting freedom
of contract? That question has already effectively
been answered: systemic externalities not
only harm the public, who cannot contract to
protect themselves, but also cause much more
harm than non-systemic externalities, including
widespread poverty and unemployment.
These are exactly the types of externalities that
should count in limiting freedom of contract.

Shareholder-primacy Model
A public governance duty would technically
be inconsistent with the shareholder-primacy
model. Proponents of shareholder primacy
argue that managers of for-profit corporations
should govern the firm solely for the best
interests of its shareholders. They accept that
firms can cause externalities, but they believe
the efficient response is for government to
regulate substance, without interfering with
corporate governance. However, where regulating
substance is insufficient, as in the case of

controlling the excessive corporate risk taking
that causes systemic externalities, the alternative
should be to regulate corporate governance.
Next consider a public governance
duty’s practicalities: how to regulate
governance without unduly weakening
corporate wealth-producing capacity.

and international problem, not usually a local
state problem. The “internalization principle”
recognizes that regulatory responsibilities
should generally be assigned to the unit of
government that best internalizes the full
costs of the underlying regulated activity. For
these reasons, Congress may be best situated
to impose a public governance duty.

Practicalities of a Public
Governance Duty

Assessing and Balancing Costs and Benefits

Under a public governance duty, the managers
of a systemically important firm would not
only have a private corporate governance
duty to the firm and its investors but also a
duty not to engage in excessive risk taking
that could systemically harm the public.14 That
public duty raises several practical issues.

Legally Imposing the Duty
How should a public governance duty be legally
imposed? Courts, for example, could create such
a duty through judicial decisions. Or legislatures
could amend their corporation laws to require
such a duty. The latter may be preferred because
imposing such a duty broadly impacts public policy.
In the United States, for example, this would mean
that a public governance duty should be imposed
either by state legislatures (especially the Delaware
legislature, because most domestic firms are
incorporated under Delaware law) or by the US
Congress. Because corporation law in the United
States is traditionally state, not federal, states
ideally should take the lead in imposing such a duty.
It is questionable, however, whether state
legislatures are well positioned to impose a public
governance duty. Any given legislature would be
unlikely to want to pioneer such a duty because
it could discourage firms from incorporating in
its state. Furthermore, systemic risk is a national

14 Cf John Carney, “Big-Bank Board Game Puts Shareholders in Second
Place”, The Wall Street Journal (5 April 2015) (noting a speech by US
Federal Reserve Governor Daniel Tarullo suggesting that “corporate
governance would need to change to broaden the scope of boards’
fiduciary duties to reflect macroprudential [i.e., systemic] regulatory
objectives”). The nation of Iceland has actually enacted legislation
that appears to require, at least in principle, the managers of certain
systemically important firms to “operate[] [their firms] in the interests
of . . . shareholders . . . and the entire national economy.” Ministry of
Industries and Innovation, Act No 161/2002 on Financial Undertakings.

How should managers of a systemically important
firm, or members of such a firm’s risk committee,15
assess and balance the public costs and private
benefits of a risk-taking activity? Consider two
approaches, one subjective and the other more
objective and ministerial. On a case-by-case
basis, managers could choose which approach
to follow. Either approach should be needed
only when deciding on a risky project whose
failure might, either itself or in combination
with other factors of which such managers are
or should be aware,16 cause the firm to fail.17
Managers following a subjective approach would
simply consider those costs and balance them
against benefits — the same way they would
consider and balance any other relevant costs
and benefits when making a corporate risk-taking
decision. Their assessment and balancing might, but
would not necessarily, be documented or explained.
Managers may favour this approach because it
would not change their current behaviour.
This subjective approach would have at least
three drawbacks, however. First, because the
consequences of a systemic collapse can be
devastating to the public, the decision-making
process to mitigate that harm should be more
transparent. Second, managers following a
subjective approach may be subject to peer
pressure to favour investor profitability over
avoiding public harm — especially when, as later

15 Surprisingly, even risk committees required by the Dodd-Frank Act in the
United States are not obligated, and indeed may have no legal authority,
to consider risks to the public.
16 Cf John Armour & Jeffrey N Gordon, “Systemic Harms and Shareholder
Value” (2014) 6 J Leg Analysis 35 (observing that “it is surely the board’s
responsibility to identify those risks which are of a magnitude and kind as
to threaten the firm’s stability” at 69).
17 Cf supra note 8 and accompanying text (observing that systemic
externalities can result from risk taking that causes the failure of a
systemically important firm).
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observed, managers often have conflicts of interest
that favour the firm’s shareholders over the public.
Third, although courts generally try to avoid
second-guessing management decisions, even
managers should want to follow an approach that
provides an explicit safe harbour against litigation
— at least if the approach is relatively ministerial.

appropriate (as Cass Sunstein has proposed in
another context19) to require “a margin of safety”
— for example, requiring that the expected value
to investors considerably exceeds the expected
value of systemic costs — to demonstrate
that a given risk-taking activity is justified.

Consider how to craft a possible ministerial
safe-harbour objective approach, using the
generic example of a systemically important
firm engaging in a risky project that could be
profitable. The expected private benefits would
be the expected value of the project to the
firm’s investors (usually the shareholders). The
expected public costs would be the expected
value of the project’s systemic costs.18

Enforcing a Public Governance Duty

In large part, the firm’s managers should have
sufficient information, or at least much more
information than third parties, about these values.
For example, managers should have much more
information than third parties about valuing
the chance of the project being successful, the
value to investors from that success, the loss
from the project’s failure, and the chance of the
firm failing as a result of the project’s failure.
The exception, however, is valuing the systemic
costs if the firm fails. That valuation should be a
public policy choice. It might be based, for example,
on the estimated cost of a government bailout to
avoid a systemic failure. Such an estimate could be
made by the government as part of the process of
designating a firm as “systemically important,” and
thereafter periodically updated by the government.
From a strict (Kaldor-Hicks) economic efficiency
standpoint, the project would be efficient if its
expected value to investors exceeds the expected
value of its systemic costs. As a public policy
matter, however, simple economic efficiency
may be insufficient because the magnitude
and harmful consequences of a systemic
collapse, if it occurs, could be devastating.

Who should enforce a public governance duty?
Under existing corporate governance law,
shareholder derivative suits are the primary
enforcement mechanism. Shareholders would
have no interest, however, in suing managers
of their firm for externalizing systemic harm.
Therefore, the government, by default, at least
should have the right to enforce the public duty.
The government itself may be unable to effectively
monitor a firm’s internal compliance with the
public governance duty until the firm fails, when
systemic consequences may be irremediable.
To facilitate better monitoring, regulation
implementing a public governance duty should
include whistleblower incentives, including
anti-retaliation protection for managers or others
involved in the risk assessment who inform
government officials of their firm’s non-compliance
and possibly also monetary rewards. Regulation
implementing a public governance duty might
even impose an obligation on managers involved
in the risk assessment to inform government
officials of their firm’s non-compliance.
Another way to facilitate better monitoring,
and more specifically enforcement, of the
public governance duty would be to incentivize
members of the public themselves. In the
United States, for example, there is precedent
for so-called qui tam suits, under which private
citizens can sue alleged defrauders in the name
of the government. If the suit is successful
or settled, the citizen-plaintiff is entitled to a
percentage of the award or settlement.20

When balancing the costs and benefits of activities
that might pose great harm, policy makers
normally apply a precautionary principle directing
regulators to err on the side of safety. Applying
that to this policy brief ’s balancing, it may be

18 The “Misalignment” article on which this policy brief is partly based
examines in detail how these costs and benefits could be calculated. See
Schwarcz, “Misalignment”, supra note 1.
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19 See Cass R Sunstein, “Beyond the Precautionary Principle” (2003) 151
U Pa L Rev 1003 (discussing a form of the precautionary principle under
which “regulation should include a margin of safety” at 1014).
20 See Schwarcz, “Misalignment”, supra note 1.

Business Judgment Rule as a Defence
A critical issue concerns the business judgment rule
as a defence to manager liability. In the traditional
corporate governance context, managerial risktaking decisions are protected to some extent
by this rule, which presumes that managers
should not be personally liable for harm caused
by negligent decisions made in good faith and
without conflicts of interest — and in some
articulations of the business judgment rule, also
without gross negligence. The rule attempts to
balance the goal of protecting investors from
losses against the goals of encouraging the best
managers to serve and avoiding the exercise of
inappropriate judicial discretion (as would occur if
courts tried to second-guess business judgments).
The business judgment rule arguably should apply
differently in a public-governance-duty context
because one of the rule’s basic assumptions —
that there be no conflict of interest — may be
breached. The interest of a manager who holds
significant shares or interests in shares, or whose
compensation or retention is dependent on share
price, is aligned with the firm’s shareholders,
not with that of the public. To that extent, the
manager would have a conflict of interest.
But how should the business judgment rule be
modified without requiring courts to exercise
inappropriate discretion or discouraging the best
people from serving as managers? One approach
would be to prevent conflicted managers who
are grossly negligent — that is, who fail to use
even slight care in assessing systemic harm to
the public — from using the rule as a defence.
Technically, this modification merely applies the
gross negligence standard that is often articulated
as part of the business judgment rule, although
rarely utilized with any rigour. Because courts
routinely review whether other types of actions
are grossly negligent, they should not find it
inappropriate or impractical to review corporate
risk-taking actions under a gross negligence
standard. As a practical matter, managers who
follow a reasonable procedure to balance public
costs and private benefits should be protected. That
would effectively conform the business judgment

rule’s public-governance-duty application to a duty
of process care, a standard commonly used.21

To What Extent Should Managers Be Protected
under Directors and Officers Liability Insurance?
Another issue is the extent to which managers
who become subject to liability for breaching
the public governance duty should be protected
under directors and officers (D&O) liability
insurance, which indemnifies managers against
personal liability. Although D&O liability insurance
is needed to incentivize good managers and
also to help ensure that sufficient funds are
available to properly incentivize private-action
lawsuits, it might compromise the deterrent
effect of imposing personal liability. Furthermore,
because the magnitude of systemic harm is
open ended, insurers may be reluctant to offer
D&O insurance covering breaches of the public
governance duty. At least one possible solution
to these concerns would be to specify a limit on
the amount of the claim that could be imposed
for breaching the public governance duty and,
like a deductible, to require managers to be
personally liable for some portion of that amount.

Conclusions
Since the financial crisis, regulators have been
trying to prevent systemically important firms
from engaging in excessive risk taking, which
is widely seen as one of the primary causes
of the crisis. Regulatory measures to date

21 The requirement that managers use at least slight care in assessing
systemic harm to the public would also be consistent with the business
judgment rule’s actual application in at least some jurisdictions that do
not formally articulate a gross negligence standard as part of the rule.
Delaware, for example, disallows business-judgment-rule protection for
managers who act in “bad faith.” See In re Walt Disney Co Derivative
Litigation, 907 A (2d) 693 (Del Ch 2005) (explaining that “[t]he
presumption of the business judgment rule creates a presumption that
a director acted in good faith” and that “[t]he good faith required of a
corporate fiduciary includes . . . duties of care and loyalty” at 755). Bad
faith is broadly defined as including conduct that “is known to constitute
a violation of applicable positive law.” Gagliardi v TriFoods Int’l, Inc,
683 A (2d) 1049 at 1051 n 2 (Del Ch 1996) [emphasis in original]. Such
conduct is interpreted to include a manager failing to take “steps in a
good faith effort to prevent or remedy” such a violation. In re Caremark
Int’l Inc Derivative Litigation, 698 A (2d) 959 at 971 (Del Ch 1996). A
manager’s failure to use even slight care when assessing systemic harm
to the public under a legally mandated public governance duty would
appear to be bad faith under those interpretations.
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are mostly designed to reduce moral hazard
from such firms being too big to fail (and thus
profiting from successful risk taking, but being
bailed out by public money in case of a failure)
or to align managerial and investor interests
(assuming investors would oppose managers
engaging their firm in excessive risk taking).

first step24 toward shaping corporate governance
norms to begin to take the public into account.25

These regulatory measures are based on
questionable assumptions. The assumption that
systemically important firms engage in morally
hazardous risk taking because they expect a
bailout has no real empirical support and may
be contrary to management incentives. The
assumption that aligning managerial and investor
interests would deter excessive risk taking is also
questionable because what constitutes excessive
risk taking depends on the observer. Although
investors would oppose risk taking that has a
negative expected value to them, systemically
important firms can take business risks that
have a positive expected value to their investors
but a negative expected value to the public
because much of the systemic harm from their
failure would be externalized onto the public.
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gouvernements du Canada et de l’Ontario ainsi
que du fondateur du CIGI, Jim Balsillie.
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